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THE MISSOURI RULE: HOSPITAL
PEER REVIEW IS DISCOVERABLE IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle1
Missouri Rule 56.01 sets forth the general provisions governing discovery
in civil cases.2 Unless otherwise limited by order of the court, the rule deline-
ates the scope of discovery as "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action."3 Missouri statutorily recog-
nizes numerous privileges.4 Generally, matter is privileged from discovery if it
would be privileged at trial under the applicable rule of evidence. 5 A claim of
privilege is an exception to the rule that all relevant material shall be revealed.
Courts are reluctant to expand or create a new privilege in the absence of
statutory support.6 Consequently, attempts to establish a claim of privilege are
given strict scrutiny and allowed in only a few instances.7
In State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle,8 the Missouri Supreme Court held
that no peer review privilege exists for factual statements under Missouri law.
The court found that Missouri statutory provisions give no basis for a peer
review privilege. 9 Additionally, the court noted that the major policy underly-
ing the peer review system is to provide benefits for patients and prospective
patients, whose care would be enhanced by the earlier peer review proceedings.
The court, in turn, rejected the argument that confidentiality is essential to
maintaining the benefits to be derived from peer review activities.10
1. 678 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
2. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
3. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b).
4. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 326.151 (1978) (certified public accountant-client);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.055 (1978) (psychologist-patient); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.020
(1978) (husband-wife); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(3) (1978) (attorney-client); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (1978) (priest-penitent); Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.260 (1978)
(accused-spouse).
5. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 549 (4th ed. 1983);
FED. R. EvID. 1101(c); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953)
("privilege" refers to privileges as understood in the law of evidence).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (privileges are
not lightly created or expansively construed since they are in derogation of the search
for truth).
7. See, e.g., Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d
177, 179 (Ky. 1973) (denying peer review privilege).
8. 678 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
9. Id. at 806.
10. Id. at 807.
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The existence of a medical peer review privilege became an issue in the
Chandra case when the plaintiff requested hospital reports pertaining to emer-
gency treatment received at the hospital.11 Anjali Kathryn Chandra, an infant
one month old, was taken to Independence Sanitarium and Hospital for treat-
ment in connection with worsening cold and respiratory congestion. In the hos-
pital x-ray department, the child suffered respiratory arrest. Her father, an
internist at the hospital, administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation and
rushed the child back to the emergency room for further treatment. Plaintiff
alleged that prior to and subsequent to this event, the doctor on duty and two
other physicians failed to respond to the emergency. Furthermore, plaintiff al-
leged that the staff could not locate the emergency medical equipment used to
treat infants. Finally, plaintiff alleged that due to the defendant's negligence,
the child suffered cerebral hypoxia (lack of oxygen to the brain), resulting in
permanent brain damage. 12
Anjali, by and through Relator Ingrid Chandra, brought a malpractice
action against the doctors and the hospital. Following the incident, the hospital
appointed an "Ad Hoc Committee" to investigate the matter. Relator re-
quested discovery of the hospital's "Ad Hoc" committee report and the stand-
ing peer review committee report.13 The defendant hospital failed to comply
with the discovery request, claiming a peer review privilege. Respondent,
Judge Richard P. Sprinkle, denied Relator's motion to compel discovery."
Following Judge Sprinkle's ruling, Relator filed a mandamus order." The
Missouri Supreme Court permitted transfer and consolidated Chandra with
State ex rel. Lester E. Cox Medical Center v. Keet.?'
11. Id. at 805-06.
12. Id. at 805.
13. Id. at 805-06.
14. Id. at 806.
15. Mo. R. Civ. P. 94.01 provides:
Proceedings in mandamus in a circuit court shall be as prescribed in this Rule
94 and in this Court or the court of appeals shall be as prescribed in Rule
84.22 to Rule 84.26, inclusive, and this Rule 94. In all particulars not pro-
vided for by the foregoing provisions, proceedings in mandamus shall be gov-
erned by and conform to the rules of civil procedure and the existing rules of
general law upon the subject and the court may, by order, direct the form of
such further details of procedure as may be necessary to the orderly course of
the action or to give effect to the remedy.
16. 678 S.W.2d 813, 814 n.2 (Mo. 1984) (en bane). The Chandra and Cox
cases were decided concurrently and essentially involve the same issues. Larry Fergu-
son was treated by Dr. Newt Wakeman for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident.
On January 28, 1981 Ferguson was admitted to Lester E. Cox Medical Center so Dr.
Wakeman could surgically remove a "zikel" nail device. Plaintiff in the underlying suit,
Freda R. Ferguson, alleged that her husband, Larry Ferguson died on February 3,
1981 as a result of post-operative infection contracted while under the care of Dr.
Wakeman and Cox Hospital. Cox, 678 S.W.2d at 814. The plaintiff requested discov-
ery of (1) documents and materials used by any peer review committee concerning the
care provided by Dr. Wakeman and Cox, (2) disclosure of information concerning the
makeup and membership of the peer review committee, (3) information as to whether
[Vol. 50
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/8
PEER REVIEW
The basic purpose of a peer review committee is to provide a mechanism
to collect information and exchange ideas in order to maintain and improve
the standard of professional care in a hospital.17 Peer review committees, com-
prised of physicians and non-medical hospital personnel, review the staff per-
formance of functions and procedures throughout the hospital. Typically, these
functions are broken down by department in large hospitals. Each department
plays an integral role in the medical care review system by providing a frame-
work for peer-group analysis within that department. A common breakdown in
a departmentalized hospital includes the following committees: credentials, tis-
sue, utilization review, medical audit, and executive."" In small, non-depart-
mentalized hospitals, with less than fifteen active staff members, the review is
typically handled by the staff as a committee of the whole.'9 The results of
committee investigations are coordinated to the highest degree possible and
used throughout the hospital to foster identification and resolution of
problems. 20
In reviewing a physician's credentials, peer review committees generally
examine whether the physician exercises his specialized skills competently and
Cox had ever revoked, restricted, or expanded the staff privileges of Dr. Wakeman, and
(4) the medical records of any patient at Cox from 1978 forward who had developed
bacterial infection or shock after surgery at Cox and disclosure of the reason of hospi-
talization of any person in the same room or ward with Mr. Ferguson. Id. at 814. The
plaintiffs agreed that the names of any patient could be removed before the records
were turned over. Id. at 814 n.1. The hospital refused to comply with the request.
Relators then obtained a preliminary writ of prohibition against Respondent Honorable
James H. Keet, Jr. Id. at 813. Chandra and Cox were decided on the same day. Id. at
813; Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 804. The Cox court upheld the trial court's motion to
compel discovery against both grounds asserted by the hospital. First, the court relied
on their public policy discussion in Chandra to put aside the claim of privilege for
medical peer review reports. Cox, 678 S.W.2d at 813. The second ground asserted was
not argued in the Chandra case. Relator Cox argued that the medical records of pa-
tients that are not party to the suit are protected by the physician-patient privilege.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(5) (1978) (see infra note 51 for text). The Respondent
argued that redacting the patients name removes any claim of privilege. Id. at 814. The
Cox court relied on State ex rel. Friedman v. Provaznik, 668 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Mo.
1984) (en banc) (disclosure after in camera inspection of the law firm's billing sheets
and other fee information), for the proposition that in camera inspection can protect
the identity and privacy of non-party patients. Judge Welliver, in dissent, distinguished
the Friedman case on the grounds that it involved unique and compelling reasons for
disclosure and was not a broad invitation to invade the attorney-client privilege. Cox,
678 S.W.2d at 815-16.
17. See K. KAPLAN & J. HOPKINS, THE Q.A. GUIDE, A RESOURCE FOR HospI-
TAL QUALITY ASSURANCE xii-xiii (1980).
18. Holbrook & Dunn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Discoverability
and Use of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54,
59-63 (1976); see also Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Le-
gal Status, I AM. J. LAW & MED. 245, 248-49 (1975).
19. K. KAPLAN & J. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 19.
20. Id. at 20.
1985]
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whether those skills are used appropriately in particular situations.21 Numer-
ous sources are used to gather information in order to identify problems. Inter-
nal sources commonly include medical reports, incident reports, infection con-
trol and other quality assurance reports, patient bills, staff and patient surveys,
and direct observation.2 External sources include Professional Service Review
Organization 23 reports, Health Systems Agency reports,24 third party payor
reports, 25 and literature related to health care.26
Peer review is required by private regulators, state regulation, and federal
legislation. Private regulation is spearheaded by the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals (JCAH), organized in 1952. The current members of
the JCAH include the American College of Surgeons, the American College
of Physicians, the American Hospital Association, the American Medical As-
sociation, and the American Dental Association.2" As a powerful private regu-
lator, the JCAH seeks to establish and maintain rigorous standards for hospi-
tals.2 8 Although accreditation by the JCAH is technically voluntary, hospitals
wishing to participate in federal Medicare funding are required to meet stan-
dards essentially identical to those promulgated by the JCAH. Generally, that
standard requires delivery of optimal patient care with available resources.29
Essential to the JCAH standard is the idea that the hospital must ultimately
police the quality of patient care.30
21. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 551, 562 (1983).
22. K. KAPLAN & J. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 49.
23. See infra notes 35-37.
24. Health Systems Agencies contract with the Department of Health and
Human Services to carry out comprehensive planning and regulatory programs on the
state and local levels. See REPRESENTING HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 62 (M. Strickler
& F. Ballard eds. 1981).
25. Third party payors account for sixty-five to ninty-five percent of most hospi-
tals' cash flow. See id. at 119.
26. Id. at 49-50.
27. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS at x (1983 ed.) (hereinafter cited as JCAH).
28. R. GOODMAN & L. GOLDSMITH, MODERN HOSPITAL LIABILITY LAW AND
TACTICS 139 (1974).
29. JCAH, supra note 27, at x-xi.
30. The JCAH guidelines provide an example of a typical peer review
committee:
Surgical case review (tissue committee function) shall be performed on a
monthly basis for cases in which a specimen (tissue or nontissue) was re-
moved, as well as for those cases in which no specimen was removed. The
review shall include the indications for surgery and all cases in which there is
a major discrepancy between the preoperative and postoperative (including
pathologic) diagnosis. A screening mechanism based on predetermined crite-
ria, may also be established for those cases involving no specimens. . . . Re-
gardless of the mechanism used, written reports shall be maintained that re-
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Because the JCAH provides guidelines3' and not models, the exact form
and substance of committee reports differ from hospital to hospital. JCAH
guidelines for documentation suggest a brief statement on the known or sus-
pected problem amenable to improvement, the source or criteria used to iden-
tify the problem, a summary of the extent of the problem, anticipated benefits
of improving the problem, and possible explanation of the problem. 32
Missouri mandates peer review in order to meet licensure requirements
authorized by the State Department of Health. 33 The Missouri regulation
dealing with peer review states that the medical staff of the hospital must meet
at least quarterly to review and evaluate the quality of clinical practice
throughout the hospital. Enumerated areas of review are selected deaths, un-
improved cases, tissue, infections, complications, errors in diagnosis, and re-
sults of treatment.34
The federal government requires a peer review of sorts. Institutions that
provide health care and health care related services that are partly or totally
funded by the federal government are reviewed by entities known as Profes-
sional Service Review Organizations (PSRO).35 The federal government con-
31. Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 18, at 58.
32. See JCAH, supra note 27, at 151-52.
33. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 197.080 (1978).
The division of health, with the advice of the state advisory council, shall
adopt, amend, promulgate and enforce such rules, regulations and standards
with respect to all hospitals or different types of hospitals to be licensed here-
under as may be designed to further the accomplishment of the purposes of
this law in promoting safe and adequate treatment of individuals in hospitals
in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare.
Id.
34. See 13 Mo. ADMIN. CODE 50-20.021(2)(C)(.10) (1982) (hospital organiza-
tion and management).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1) (1982). Section 1320c-3(a) provides:
Any utilization and quality control peer review organization entering into a
contract with the Secretary under this part must perform the following
functions:
(1) The organization shall review some or all of the professional activities
in the area subject to the terms of the contract, of physicians and other health
care practioners and institutional and noninstitutional providers of health care
services in the provision of health care services and items for which payment
may be made (in whole or in part) under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
for the purpose of determining whether-
(A) such services and items are or were reasonable and medically neces-
sary and whether such services and items are not allowable under subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(9) of section 1395y of this title;
(B) the quality of such services meets professionally recognized standards
of health care; and
(C) in case such services and items are proposed to be provided in a
hospital or other health care facility on an inpatient basis, such services and
items could consistent with the provision of appropriate medical care be effec-
tively provided more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient
health care facility of a different type.
1985]
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tracts with a PSRO to monitor hospital costs and quality of services.36 This
form of review is external and should be distinguished from the internal peer
review system at issue in Chandra. Significantly, federally-funded review orga-
nizations are protected from disclosure by statute.3 7
In Chandra, the court refused to recognize a privilege for peer review
committee reports. Privileges are restrictions on what is otherwise broad dis-
covery.3 8 Privileged communications are those made by persons maintaining
certain confidential relationships. Relationships that typically command privi-
leged status are those of husband and wife, attorney and client, juror and fel-
low juror, government and informer, priest and penitent, and physician and
patient. 39 Additionally, statutes create privileged communications which vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.40
Any finding that information is protected from discovery reflects a bal-
ancing of interests. Society's interest in a full and fair adjudication of the liti-
gated issues culminates in a party's right to discovery. By contrast, society's
interest in protecting the confidentiality of disclosures made within the context
of certain relationships of acknowledged social value compels privileged com-
munications.41 In balancing these competing interests, the Missouri legislature
See generally New Developments in LAW/MEDICINE 50-54 (G. Morris & M. Norton
eds. 1974)
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2 (1982). Subsection (c) provides that:
Each contract with an organization under this section shall provide that-
(1) the organization shall perform the functions set forth in section
1320c-3(a) of this section, or may subcontract for the performance of all or
some of such functions (and for purposes of paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsec-
tion (b) of this section, a subcontract under this paragraph shall not consti-
tute an affiliation with the subcontractor);
(2) the Secretary shall have the right to evaluate the quality and effec-
tiveness of the organization in carrying out the functions specified in the con-
tract ....
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9 (1982). Section 1320c-9(c) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to disclose any such information described
in subsection (a) of this section other than for the purposes provided in sub-
sections (a) and (b) of this section, and any person violating the provisions of
this section shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $ 1000, and impris-
oned for not more than 6 months, or both, and shall be required to pay the
costs of prosecution.
Although PSRO's operate from the outside, they gather much the same information as
internal peer review committees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3a(1-3).
38. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1084 (1983).
39. J. WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2197, at 114 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961).
40. For a list of statutorily privileged relationships in Missouri, see supra note
4. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 2286, at 528-30, for a list of privileges asserted
in other jurisdictions (government-informer, partner-partner, clerk-employer, banker-
depositer, journalist-source).
41. Brief for Relator at 15, State ex rel. Lester E. Cox Medical Center v. Keet,
678 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
464 [Vol. 50
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has displayed an awareness of the value of certain confidential relationships by
creating numerous statutory privileges.42 Moreover, Missouri courts have in-
terpreted the statutes to meet legislatively desired purposes. 3 Missouri stat-
utes also provide privileges of varying degrees of protection with regard to
professional peer review.44
Prior to Chandra, Missouri courts had never confronted the issue of dis-
coverability of peer review committee reports by malpractice plaintiffs. The
Chandra court commenced its analysis with an examination of Missouri Re-
vised Statutes section 537.035.45 It first determined that the statute provides
"no basis for recognition of a peer review privilege."'46 Rather, the statute pro-
tects peer review committee members against civil liability for actions taken
pursuant to or arising out of the committee's investigation. The Chandra court
found that the underlying policy of the statute was to eliminate peer review
committee members' apprehension of lawsuits for their good faith appraisal of
fellow professionals.47
The hospital argued that section 537.035 should be expanded beyond its
express terms to protect committee members from the discoverability of peer
review committee reports as well as from civil liability. The Chandra court,
however, found a clear difference between the immunity from civil liability
42. See supra note 4.
43. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 237 Mo. App. 464, 470, 172
S.W.2d. 269, 272 (St. L. 1943) (recognized value to be protected in the physician-
patient relationship is allowing patients to make full and frank disclosures to their med-
ical advisor in order to enhance treatment).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 326.134 (Supp. 1984) (certified public accountants peer
review); Mo. REV. STAT. § 331.045 (1978) (chiropractor exempt from liability when
serving on insurance peer review board); id. § 335.031 (1978) (nursing board).
45. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.035 (1978) provides that no licensed physician, sur-
geon, dentist, podiatrist, optometrist, or pharmacist
while acting, within their scope of practice, as an authorized member of a
hospital review, medical review, dental review, podiatry review, optometry re-
view, pharmacy review, utilization review, or peer review committee function-
ing for the sole purpose of maintaining the professional standards of those
engaged in the practice of the above professions, or for maintaining profes-
sional standards in a hospital as established by its medical society or by the
medical staff of the hospital creating the committee, and no governing board
or member of such a board of a hospital licensed under the provisions of chap-
ter 197, RSMo, acting upon a recommendation of any such committee, shall
be liable in damages to any person subject to the actions of the committee or
board for any action taken or recommendation made by the committee or
board or by a person acting in his official capacity as a member of any such
committee or board when such action or recommendation was made within
the scope and function of the committee if such action or recommendation
was made without malice and was supported by creditable evidence upon con-
sideration of the whole record.
46. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 806-07. Other courts have examined the issue of
statutory immunity. See Hall, supra note 18, at 254-64; Comment, Medical Peer Re-
view Protection In the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 571-75 (1979).
47. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 806.
1985] 465
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granted by the statute and the privilege of confidentiality requested by the
hospital and refused to endorse the latter protection. 8
In support of its position, the court relied on Klinge v. Lutheran Medical
Center.49 In that case, the physician-plaintiff sought a restraining order to en-
join the hospital, its board of directors, employees, and physician staff mem-
bers from examining the records of the plaintiff's patients in order to evaluate
the physician's competency. 50 The Klinge court held that Missouri Revised
Statutes section 491.060(5),51 which sets forth the statutory physician and pa-
tient privilege, did not preclude the hospital review committee from examining
medical records of a staff physician's patients to determine the doctor's compe-
tency and qualifications.52 The-Klinge court expressed the belief that peer re-
view exists for the benefit of the public by insuring that individual patients
receive hospital care performed at a highly professional level.53 Applying the
policy considerations espoused in Klinge, the Chandra court found that peer
review encourages the improvement of medical care because the doctor knows
that his work will be analyzed by his peers at a later date.5
The Chandra court further expressed the belief that the peer review sys-
tem exists for the benefit of patients. From this statement of policy, the court
found that the public interest lies in the discoverability and not the confidenti-
ality of peer review committee reports. 55 To give effect to this policy choice,
the court held that peer review is discoverable as to factual matters. 56
In apparent response to the lack of direct Missouri authority, the Chan-
dra court turned to federal -and state case law. Though the issue of discover-
ability of peer review records has seldom been litigated in either federal or
state courts, several unifying themes emerge from the decisions which address
the issue. Those courts which have denied the creation of a peer review privi-
lege have done so for four major reasons. Primarily, courts refuse to create a
privilege where no statutory grounds exist. Essentially these courts recognize
that privileges are impediments to facts which may lead to the proper resolu-
tion of the lawsuit. 57 Second, a consequence of the belief that privileges in
48. Id. at 807.
49. 518 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
50. Id. at 161.
51. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(5) (1978 & Supp. 1984) provides:
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:
A physician or surgeon, concerning any information which he may have
acquired from any patient while attending him in a professional character,
and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such pa-
tient as a physician, or do any act for him as a surgeon.
52. Klinge, 518 S.W.2d at 166.
53. Id. at 167.
54. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 807.
55. Id. at 807.
56. Id. at 808.
57. See Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) (evi-
dentiary privileges operate to exclude relevant evidence and block fact finding); Ott v.
[Vol. 50
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general are not favored is the idea that a state regulation or statute not specifi-
cally granting a privilege from discovery cannot be expanded.58
Third, courts tend to favor plaintiffs in cases where the policy choice be-
tween a plaintiff's right to discover and the chilling effect discovery may have
on peer review has been examined. 59 Finally, in actions by doctors whose staff
privileges have been revoked or denied, discovery has been allowed to avoid
the fear that shrouding the peer review process from public disclosure would
lead to use of the system for anti-competitive or other improper purposes.
6 0
Generally, those states that have refused to create judicially a peer review
privilege have done so by statute.6 1 However, two courts have allowed a medi-
St. Luke Hosp., 522 F. Supp. 706, 710 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (only strong public policy
should be permitted to prevent disclosure); Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 234 Kan.
13, 25, 669 P.2d 209, 215 (1983) (public has a right to every man's evidence); Naza-
reth Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1973) (im-
pediments to truth afforded validity in few instances); Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass.
525, -, 467 N.E.2d 143, 147 (1984) (privileges are exception to rule that public has
right to all evidence); Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190,
197-98, 248 N.W.2d 433, 439 (1977) (privileges are strictly scrutinized in accordance
with general attitude of narrowing privileges).
58. See Wesley, 234 Kan. at 18-19, 669 P.2d at 213-14 (regulation does not rise
to the level of privilege created by statute); Cronin, 392 Mass. at , 467 N.E.2d at
147 (in absence of statute courts are reluctant to create a privilege); Davison, 75 Wis.
2d at 199, 248 N.W.2d at. 439 (limited privilege or confidentiality cannot be
expanded).'
59. See Ott, 522 F. Supp. at 711 (plaintiff's ability to bring claim would be
totally negated if privilege allowed); Wesley, 234 Kan. at 26, 669 P.2d at 219 (decline
to adopt privilege though in some instances it may be warranted); Nazareth, 503
S.W.2d at 179 (public policy in favor of broad discovery); Cronin, 392 Mass. at ,
467 N.E.2d at 149 (trial court exercised discretion in allowing discovery in face of
conflicting public policy); see also Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 106,
110, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87-88 (1967) (court denies privilege but without analyzing the
chilling effect of discovery on peer review); Davison, 75 Wis. 2d at 204, 248 N.W.2d at
441 (allows discovery although statutory privilege enacted after trial court decision but
prior to appeal).
60. See Memorial Hosp., 664 F.2d at 1062-63 (policy of private enforcement of
anti-trust law too strong to permit exclusion of evidence); Ott, 522 F. Supp. at 711
(danger physician might be removed simply because he "made waves"); Cronin, 392
Mass. -, 467 N.E.2d at 147 (important to assure that decisions are made on proper
grounds). The policy supporting a privilege for peer review in medical malpractice
cases is not as persuasive in the area of denial or revocation of staff privileges. Denying
discovery of the committee reports wherein doctors are evaluated for fitness would ef-
fectively deny the plaintiff-doctor any possibility of contesting the dismissal. Moreover,
any affirmative action taken by the committee, e.g., revoking staff privileges, would
probably become publicly available, thus there is less feeling initially that the commu-
nication would be kept confidential. Interview with Douglas Harpool, Representative
134th District, Missouri House of Representatives (February 14, 1985). However, a
plaintiff in a malpractice action, may have numerous sources outside the peer review
committee reports. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
61. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1985); 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws
238 § 7(c); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.377(2) (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.38 (West
Supp. 1975-84).
9
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cal peer review privilege in the absence of a statute. 2 In these cases, the
courts recognized two factors in denying or limiting the discoverability of peer
review documents. First, confidentiality is necessary for the effective function-
ing of peer review committees. Constructive criticism will not occur in an at-
mosphere of apprehension generated by the potential use of peer review
records in a medical malpractice suit.6 3 Second, there is an indication that
some of the requested matter was not relevant to the malpractice suit and
therefore not discoverable. 64
Numerous courts have discussed the application of a peer review privilege
where statutory protection has been provided. Although the cases apply or
construe statutes of varying degrees of protection, a number of unifying ideas
identify the scope of a peer review privilege. First, courts in states which have
passed some type of protection for peer review generally construe the statutes
broadly to give effect to the legislature's policy choice.65 Second, courts have
62. Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affid mem., 479
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
63. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250 (professional criticism cannot occur in atmo-
sphere of apprehension); Gillman, 53-F.R.D. at 318 (constructive criticism suppressed
by fear of consequences). Numerous courts have recognized but not adopted this rea-
soning. See, e.g., Wesley, 234 Kan. at 22, 669 P.2d at 216 (quoting Bredice at length).
64. See Gillman, 53 F.R.D. at 319 (plaintiff sought production of various re-
ports made after husband committed suicide while in care of defendant); Bredice, 50
F.R.D. at 251 (plaintiff sought minutes of board meeting and reports to malpractice
carrier concerning death of plaintiff's decedent). Some of the matter was irrelevant in
that it related to suggestion for future improvement or was one person's opinion as to
what was relevant after the incident. See Gillman 53 F.R.D. at 319; Bredice, 50
F.R.D. at 251.
65. See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 425 (5th Cir. 1974) (federal court in
diversity jurisdiction recognizing state-created privilege protects university hospital in-
vestigative committee); Schulz v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 445, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 67, 70 (1977) (construction of statute which would lead to discovery of peer
review when either staff doctor or hospital are parties leads to an absurd result); Posey
v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396, 398-99, 586 P.2d 36, 37-38 (1978) (broad policy
interpretation to include "hospitals" where statute only said "physicians"); Segal v.
Roberts, 380 So. 2d 1049, 1051-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (statute only protects
peer review committee reports related to the lawsuit and not those reports made several
years earlier at a different hospital, but policy behind peer review process so compelling
it dictates disclosure only in most necessitous circumstances), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d
117 (Fla. 1980); Dade County Med. Ass'n. v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (medical society committee records not discoverable in auto accident case
though statute limited privilege to actions against health care providers); Mennes v.
South Chicago Community Hosp., 100 Il. App. 3d 1029, 1032, 427 N.E.2d 952, 953
(1981) (court refuses to give narrow reading to statute that would undermine the goal
of candid commentary in peer review committees). But see Baxter County Newspapers,
Inc., v. Medical Staff, 273 Ark. 511, 514, 622 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Ark. 1981) (county-
owned hospital required to allow reporter to sit in on credentials committee hearing
under Arkansas Freedom of Information Act even though committee reports were stat-
utorily protected from discovery); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court 38
Cal. App. 3d 579, 587, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 568 (1974) (information only nondiscover-
able and not absolutely privileged could be waived by partial disclosure); Matviuw v.
10
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consistently refused to apply the privilege to material that is available from
original or other unprivileged sources.6 Finally, peer review committee privi-
leges have survived challenges on constitutional equal protection grounds.
6 7
The Chandra court also considered the application of a peer review privi-
lege in areas outside the medical field. The court noted that a privilege for
such peer review committees has not been widely recognized. 8
Achieving the proper balance between a perceived need to protect com-
munications in a confidential relationship and a court's interest in obtaining all
facts relevant to an issue is a difficult task. The Chandra court, had it believed
that policy considerations would support the creation of a privilege, in effect
had its hands tied by the absence of statutory guidance.6 9
Johnson, 70 II1. App. 3d 481, 488, 388 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1979) (statutory peer review
protection not extended to defamatory remarks motivated by ill will or malice), aff'd,
111 111. App. 3d 629, 444 N.E.2d 606 (1982); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 167
(Tex. 1977) (statute does not protect communications between patient and physician or
records of patients appearing in surgical journal).
66. See Lipschultz v. Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 16, 19, 623 P.2d 805, 808
(1981) (en banc) (evidence not privileged if it was not privileged before it came into
hands of peer review committee); Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatic Center v. District
Court, 683 P.2d 343, 345 (Colo. 1984) (merely because patients' records are used in
peer review proceedings does not bring them within the purview of statute); Eubanks v.
Ferrier, 245 Ga. 763, 767, 267 S.E.2d 230, 233 (1980) (plaintiff's attorney should be
allowed to question committee doctors who had previously treated plaintiff's deceased
husband) (also allowed to use committee members as expert witnesses but no hypothet-
ical question may include reference to membership on the committee); Jenkins v. Wu,
102 Ill. 2d 468, -, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (1984) (patients have full access to their
own records, can depose all persons involved in their treatment, and hire experts to give
their opinion as to the treatment the plaintiff received); Atkins v. Walker, 65 Ohio
App. 2d 136, 140, 416 N.E.2d 651, 654 (1979) (documents available from other
sources may not be barred simply by passing them through credentials committee);
Texarkana Memorial Hosp. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex. 1977) (presentation in
hospital committee does not make it privileged if proved by means apart from the
record).
67. See Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at -, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1166-68 (no suspect clas-
sification, reasonable and not arbitrary difference bearing substantial relation to a
proper legislative purpose); Young v. Gersten, 56 Ohio Misc. 1, -, 381 N.E.2d 353,
355 (1978) (test is reasonableness according to attendant circumstances).
68. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 806; see Bergman v. Kemp, 97 F.R.D. 413, 416
(W.D. Mich. 1983) (self-examination privilege for FBI task force); Lloyd v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 520 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (plaintiff sought information from
executive committee designed to review, analyze, and evaluate operations for self-im-
provement); see also Flanagan, supra note 21, at 551 (rejecting a general privilege for
self-critical analysis).
69. In State ex rel. Husgen v. Stussie, 617 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Mo. App., E.D.
1981), the court, with regard to the court's and the legislature's relative roles in estab-
lishing a privilege stated:
[T]he physician-patient privilege embodies the legislature's balancing of
societal interests of confidentiality in furthering full disclosure thereby facili-
tating treatment and interests served by disclosure of such information in
court. If a new balance is to be struck . . . this is the proper role for the
46919851
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Contrary to the Chandra court's finding, there are strong policy consider-
ations favoring peer review which weigh heavily on the proper balance be-
tween privilege and discovery. Bredice v. Doctors HospitaP0 best summarizes
this statement of policy:
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and
these meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and
treatment of patients. Candid and conscientious evaluations of clinical prac-
tices is a sine qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions
and deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional
necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations. Constructive profes-
sional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doc-
tor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a
malpractice suit.71
The purpose of medical peer review is to improve the quality of medical
care by collecting and comparing information.7 2 To be effective, peer review
must be a critical process.7 3 Because members of peer review committees are
required to be critical in their analyses, the possibility of disclosure in a medi-
cal malpractice suit creates two primary fears. First, peer review committee
members may fear that suggestions for improvement or alternative treatment
will be perceived by a jury as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct.7 4 In
some instances, the introduction of peer review committee reports into evi-
dence may be a problem. 75 However, if the reports are admitted or used for
impeachment, committee members may be called upon to defend or explain
statements made in the peer review committee deliberations. The proceedings
of a peer review committee are primarily retrospective views reflecting opin-
ions, not facts,7 6 and thus are not designed for use in judicial proceedings.
Even if a peer review committee member were not called as a witness, he
would still fear that a comment made in committee would tend to incriminate
legislature and not for this court.
See also Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378, 384 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (context
of statutory interpretation is a different matter than judicial creation of a privilege in
face of opposing policy choices). But see State ex rel Cain v. Baker 540 S.W.2d 50,
54-56 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (judicially extending attorney-client privilege to include
insured's statements to adjuster).
70. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.C. Cir.), af'd, 479 F.2d 920 (1970).
71. Id. at 250.
72. See K. KAPLAN & J. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at xii.
73. Flanagan, supra note 21 at 562 (hypercritical scrutiny prevents stagnation).
74. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
75. In some cases the peer review reports may not be relevant to the plaintiff's
cause of action. See supra note 64. Moreover, since the JCAH requirements do not
specifically outline how the records should be made or maintained, not all hospital
records will qualify as business records in that they may not be made in the regular
course of business. Unless some other exception to the hearsay rule is found, the reports
will be inadmissable. See Hall, supra note 18, at 278.
76. Hall, supra note 18, at 279.
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his colleague even where no fault has occurred. 7
Establishing negligence in a medical malpractice case requires more than
an unsuccessful result. A physician who exercises his own best judgment will
not be convicted of negligence as long as there is room for an honest difference
of opinion among competent physicians.78 An honest opinion expressed at a
peer review committee proceeding may be misunderstood when a plaintiff's
attorney presents the record to the jury. It is clear that there exists a differ-
ence between a doctor's finding made in the spirit of improving health care1 9
and the degree of medical certainty required to establish negligence in a mal-
practice case.80 Given the different atmosphere of the educationally oriented
peer review committee8" and the adversarial nature of a medical malpractice
case, there is no reason to doubt that a committee member would fear the use
of a comment or opinion in the context of a malpractice case.8
The possibility of peer review disclosure also produces the fear of in-
creased professional and social pressure.8 3 For example, co-workers may be
pressured not to disclose a difference of opinion because to do so would reflect
poorly on the profession in general.8 4 Moreover, discovery inhibits peer review
in that subtle pressure to minimize or not report an untoward incident is
placed on employees who provide information to peer review committees. This
pressure increases with the availability of discovery in that the fear of reprisal
for reporting something which might lead to liability for their employers is
greater.8 5 Therefore, permitting disclosure of peer review studies in medical
malpractice actions affects the objectivity and dedication of those who conduct
the studies.8 Of course, the degree to which this chilling of objectivity and
candor occurs depends in large part on the integrity of the medical profession
and its interest in maintaining its good reputation. 7
77. Wesley, 234 Kan. at 32, 669 P.2d. at 223 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting) (re-
ality of human nature is to refrain from criticism of a colleague where it might be used
in a future lawsuit).
78. Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967) (plaintiff must show
that treatment was clearly against care recognized as correct by the profession); Sny-
der v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 228 Mo. App. 626, 640, 72 S.W.2d 504, 512 (Spr. 1934)
(mistaken diagnosis alone provides no basis for action); see also W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 186 (5th ed. 1984) (doctor not liable
for an honest mistake).
79. See Hall, supra note 18, at 279-80.
80. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 78, § 32, at 187 (doc-
tor must have and use the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily possessed and employed
by a member of the profession in good standing).
81. See supra notes 72, 76.
82. See Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
83. Flanagan, supra note 21, at 559.
84. M. MILLMAN, THE UNKINDEST CUT, LIFE IN THE BACKROOMS OF
MEDICINE 117 (1978).
85. Note, supra note 38, at 1091-92.
86. Flanagan, supra note 21, at 559.
87. Wesley, 234 Kan. at 25, 669 P.2d at 219 (integrity of profession will main-
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The Missouri legislature has recognized the need for enhancing the medi-
cal peer review system by providing immunity from liability for actions or
recommendations made by members of peer review committees. 88 By providing
immunity, the legislature insures that members of a medical review committee
can function without the fear of exposure to libel, slander, or related actions.89
Similar statutory immunity is granted to other professional peer review com-
mittees. 90 In addition to providing immunity for members of certified public
accountant (CPA) peer review committees, the legislature has provided a stat-
utory discovery privilege.91 The express purpose of the privilege is to "assure a
free flow of information."92 Like medical peer review, CPA peer review is re-
quired by state law.9 3
Medical peer review systems are worthy of the same type of double pro-
tection (immunity and discovery) that is afforded to CPA peer review. As
pointed out by the dissent in Chandra, the most common approach for deter-
mining whether a discovery privilege should be allowed is Wigmore's four-
pronged test.94 First, the parties must agree that the communication should be
confidential. Second, confidentiality must be a necessary ingredient to the
maintenance of the agreement. Third, the confidential relation must be one
that the community actively encourages. Fourth, the harm from disclosure
tain quality of peer review); see also K. KAPLAN & J. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 41 (a
few isolated people from any professional group can disrupt a quality assurance
activity).
88. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.035; see also supra note 45. The similarity between
the immunity granted by this statute and the privilege requested in Chandra is the
desire to shield the peer review committee from external pressures. See generally Hall,
supra note 18, at 255.
89. Hall, supra note 18, at 254-55.
90. Mo. REV. STAT. § 326.134 (Supp. 1984) (certified .public accountant peer
review); Mo. REV. STAT. § 331.045 (Supp. 1984) (chiropractor's immunity for partici-
pating in insurance peer review); id. § 335.031 (nursing board).
91. Id. § 326.134.1 (Supp. 1984).
1. In order to assure a free flow of information for peer review pursuant to
section 326.055, or proceedings before the board pursuant to section 326.132,
all complaint files, investigation files, and all other investigation reports and
other investigative information in the possession of the board or peer review
committee or firm, acting under the authority of section 326.055 or 326.132,
or its employees or agents, which relate to such hearings or review shall be
privileged and confidential and shall not be subject to discovery, subpoena, or
other means of legal compulsion for their release to any person, other than the
permit or certificate holder and the board or peer review committee or firm or
their employees and agents involved in such proceedings, or be admissible in
evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding, other than the proceed-
ing for which such material was prepared or assembled. A final written deci-




93. Mo. REV. STAT. § 326.055.2 (Supp. 1984).
94. 678 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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must outweigh the benefit to be gained by the party seeking the information. 5
An examination of these four principles reveals that the medical peer re-
view process would qualify for such a privilege in Missouri. As to the first
requirement, the state of affairs in Missouri prior to Chandra was such that
doctors participated in peer review proceedings with the understanding that
communications made in the course of peer review proceedings would be confi-
dential. 9 Furthermore, state regulation of peer review proceedings provide for
confidentiality.97 In all likelihood, these regulations contributed to a doctor's
belief that communications were made in confidence. Thus, the first element of
a qualified privilege is satisfied.9 8
The requirement that confidentiality must be essential to the maintenance
of the relationship encompasses the policy underlying the privilege. As dis-
cussed above, permitting discovery will create a direct chilling effect on the
peer review system and its individual members. This effect operates to discour-
age the analyst from investigating thoroughly and frankly.9 9 Moreover, "com-
mon sense suggests that opening up the peer review process to the multitude of
malpractice victims will indirectly, if not directly, affect the manner in which
medical personnel criticize or evaluate their colleagues.' 0 °
The third requirement-that the confidential process or relation be one
that the community actively encourages-is clearly met. The sheer number of
private rules and state and federal regulations indicates that the community
95. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 2285, at 527-28; see also Wesley, 234 Kan.
at 29-30, 669 P.2d at 221-22 (Schroeer, C.J., dissenting) (endorsing Wigmore four-
pronged test).
96. No cases have directly dealt with the issue of peer review discovery in Mis-
souri prior to Chandra. It is therefore assumed that plaintiffs did not press the issue of
discovery and doctors did not worry about the possibility of disclosure by legal
compulsion.
97. See, e.g., 13 Mo. ADMIN. CODE 50-20.021(2)(c)(9) (1982). This portion of
the Administrative Code provides that "[w]ritten minutes shall be signed and perma-
nently filed on a confidential basis in the hospital." Id. The regulations fail to establish
a privilege in and of themselves because they do not speak to the discovery question.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the confidentiality applies exclusively to the medical
staff meetings required under 13 Mo. ADMIN. CODE 50-20.021(2)(c)(8) which provides
that: "The organized medical staff shall meet at least once each six (6) months. A
mechanism shall be established for monthly decision-making by or on behalf of the
medical staff," or includes the peer review requirement found in 13 Mo. ADMIN. CODE
50-20.021(2)(c)(10) which states:
The medical staff as a body or through committee shall review and evaluate
the quality of clinical practice of the staff throughout the hospital at least
once each quarter. Such review and evaluation shall include selected deaths,
unimproved cases, tissue, infections, complications, errors in diagnosis, and
results of treatment.
98. See Wesley, 234 Kan. at 30, 669 P.2d at 222 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting);
Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 811 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
99. Note, supra note 38, at 1092.
100. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 811 (Welliver J., dissenting).
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actively encourages the peer review system. 110 Medical peer review committees
serve essentially the same purpose as licensure laws and regulation: maintain-
ing and improving the quality of health care. 02 Thus, peer review is a useful
tool in improving health care and is fostered by the medical community repre-
sented by the JCAH as well as the general community.
Finally, the condition that the harm from disclosure be greater than the
benefit thereby gained necessarily requires a balancing of interests test. In sup-
port of discovery is the idea that only in special circumstances should an im-
pediment to obtaining the truth in a judicial proceeding be allowed.10 3 The
Chandra court found that future patients and patients presently being treated
are to benefit from peer review and, therefore, the public interest lies in dis-
coverability. 1'0 Discovery in this light would improve health care. Since doc-
tors are aware that their comments will be scrutinized by plaintiff's attorneys,
they will be anxious to review each situation carefully. 05
Aligned against a plaintiff's right to discover relevant information are a
number of policy considerations and practical problems. First and most impor-
tant is the notion that to be effective, peer review must be afforded confidenti-
ality.' 08 While it is true that peer review is designed to serve present and fu-
ture patients, it can serve neither if peer review committee members are so
intimidated by the prospect of malpractice actions that they are not objective
or candid. The second policy consideration stems from the very fact that peer
review committee proceedings originate in confidence. Private regulation and
state law mandate that peer review be conducted in a confidential manner.10 7
Simple fairness suggests that a communication made between parties, with the
requirement and understanding that it is confidential to their relation, should
not be breached by an outside party. In the absence of statutory protection,
members of peer review committees are subjected to a "Catch 22" require-
ment-namely that they maintain confidentiality and at the same time antici-
pate that they may have to give testimony or produce subpoenaed records.
The third factor which weighs in favor of a discovery privilege is the lack
of harm that a limited privilege would cause a plaintiff's case.208 Allowing a
101. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
102. Peer review committees work to maintain high standards of health care.
Arguably, because peer review committees monitor institutional clinical care on a day-
to-day basis they are more effective than state licensure boards. Hall, supra note 18, at
247.
103. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
104. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 807.
105. Id. at 811 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (lawyers will constantly scour the
records).
106. Gillman, 53 F.R.D. at 318 (comment will more easily flow if it is known to
be privileged); Bredice, 50 F.R.D at 250 (confidentiality is essential to effective peer
review); see also supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
107. 13 Mo. ADMIN. CODE 50.20.021(2)(c)(9) (1982) (see supra note 97 for
text); see also JCAH, supra note 27, at 193.
108. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 811, (Welliver, J., dissenting) (denying access to
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privilege would not lead to immediate summary judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff will still have access to his own medical records as well as any
other relevant business records. Persons with firsthand knowledge of an inci-
dent could be compelled to testify. Finally, the malpractice victim can hire his
own expert witness to evaluate and give his opinion of the disclosed facts. 109
A related practical problem is the possibility that plaintiffs may use the
peer review committee member as an unwilling witness. A plaintiff should be
required to build his own case and should be prohibited from taking advantage
of the opinions contained in a peer review committee report.110 The foregoing
factors serve to satisfy the fourth prong of Wigmore's test by showing that the
policy of protecting peer review outweighs the policy in favor of discovery.
To recap, it is clear that medical peer review meets the Wigmore four-
pronged test. Peer review conferences originate with the understanding that
confidentiality will be maintained. Confidentiality is necessary to the mainte-
nance of the peer review system which has widely recognized social value. Fi-
nally, the harm from disclosing peer review committee reports outweighs the
plaintiff's minimal loss.
The Missouri legislature should consider the strong policies in favor of
peer review and provide a statutory privilege."" Forty-five states have some
information does not hinder litigants' ability to obtain facts).
109. See Jenkins, 102 II1. 2d at _ 468 N.E.2d. at 1168 (patients have full
access to their own records, can depose all persons involved in their treatment, and hire
experts to give their opinion as to the treatment the plaintiff received).
110. See Flanagan, supra note 21, at 576; see also Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 811
(Welliver J. dissenting) (litigant can obtain his own witness).
11l. Three attempts by the Missouri legislature to provide a statutory discovery
privilege have failed. See S.B. 110, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1981); H.B.
1451, 81st Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (1982); S.B. 227, 82d Gen. Assembly, 1st
Reg. Sess. (1982). A fourth attempt under consideration at the time of writing was
recently adopted. See H.B. 357, 83rd Gen. Assembly 1st Reg. Sess. (1985). The act in
large part echoes the concerns presented in this note. It provides in relevant part
I . ... (2) "Peer review committee", a committee of health care profession-
als with the responsibility to evaluate, maintain, or monitor the quality and
utilization of heath care services or to exercise any combination of such re-
sponsibilities . ...
4. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the proceedings, findings, de-
liberations, reports, and minutes of peer review committees concerning the
health care provided any patient are priviliged and shall not be subject to
discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for their release to
any person or entity or be admissible into evidence in any judicial or adminis-
trative action for failure to provide appropriate care. Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, no person who was in attendance at any peer review
committee proceeding shall be permitted or required to disclose any informa-
tion acquired in connection with or in the course of such proceeding, or to
disclose any opinion, recommendation, or evaluation of the committee or
board, or any member thereof; provided, however, that information otherwise
discoverable or admissible from original sources is not to be construed as im-
mune from discovery or use in any proceeding merely because it was
presented during proceedings before a peer review committee nor is a mem-
19851
17
Daniel: Daniel: Missouri Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
degree of statutory limitation on the discovery, evidentiary use, or disclosure of
peer review committee reports."' The statutes provide various methods and
degrees of protection, but a number of definable trends are present. The vast
majority of states provide that all the proceedings, records, reports, events and
testimony of peer review committees are privileged and not subject to disclos-
ure, discovery, or admittance into evidence."'"
Of the states that provide statutory privilege, two have limited the privi-
lege by allowing discovery in extraordinary circumstances where a party shows
good cause. 1 4 Other states have taken different approaches to limiting the
privilege. For instance, in an action where the subject matter is the care and
treatment of a party, one state allows discovery for impeachment purposes
ber, employee, or agent of such committee, or other person appearing before
it, to be prevented from testifying as to matters within his personal knowledge
and in accordance with the other provisions of this section, but such witness
cannot be questioned about testimony or other proceedings before any health
care review committee or board or about opinions formed as a result of such
committee hearings ....
6. Nothing in this section shall limit authority otherwise provided by law of a
health care licensing board of the state of Missouri to obtain information by
subpoena or other authorized process from peer review committees or to re-
quire disclosure of otherwise confidential information relating to matters and
investigations within the jurisdiction of such health care licensing boards.
112. ALA. CODE § 22-21-8(b) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (1981); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (Supp. 1975-84); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-934 (1979);
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-110(1)
(1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-25 (West Supp. 1984); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1768 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40(4) (West Supp. 1984);
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1908 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 624-25.5 (Supp. 1983);
IDAHO CODE § 39-1392b (1977 & 1984 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 8-2101
(1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-4-3-1 (Burns 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.42 (West
1972); 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 238 § 7(c); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.377(2) (1983); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. 13 § 3715.3 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §
2510(3) (1964); MD. HEALTH Occ. CODE ANN. § 14-601(d) (1981 & Supp. 1984);
MICH. Comp. LAWS. ANN. § 333.2632 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.64 (West
Supp. 1984); MISS, CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 (1972 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§§ 50-16-203, 50-16-205 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 49.265 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:13-a (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-22.8 (West Supp. 1984-85); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-9-5 (1982 Supp. Pam-
phlet); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 § 405.24(k) (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95
(Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.251 (Page 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-709 (West 1984); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 41.675 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 425.4 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-37.3-7 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-26.1 (1977); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 4447d § 3 (Vernon 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1958-1960
(Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.17 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.250
(Supp. 1963-1985); W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.38
(West Supp. 1975-1984); Wyo. STAT. § 35-2-602 (1977).
113. W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (Supp. 1984) provides a typical example.
114. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2408 (1981); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.17 (1984);
see also IND. CODE ANN. § 16-4-3-1 (Burns 1983) (requiring that the proponent of
disclosure show the materiality and relevancy of the documents requested).
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only, provided the defendants receive thirty days notice.1 5 Another limitation
is achieved by statutes that make the reports publicly available but eliminate
any means of direct or indirect identification of patients and health care prov-
iders.116 One state does not expressly grant nondiscovery status to peer review
committee reports but provides that the information must be used solely for
the improvement of health care.1 7 Finally, some statutes simply state that the
records shall be confidential.""' By contrast, the majority of statutes allow dis-
covery in actions by physicians who have lost or been denied their staff
positions."19
Perhaps the most important provision commonly found in statutes which
provide a peer review privilege is the distinction between matters otherwise
discoverable, which are not protected, and those which are purely the product
of the peer review committee."20 The statutes provide that material otherwise
discoverable is not privileged simply because it passed through the committee.
Thus, a potential witness could not clothe his personal knowledge of a matter
with a prohibition against disclosure merely by reciting his knowledge in a
peer review proceeding. Conversely, a matter learned only because the person
was a member of a peer review committee is not subject to discovery. 2"'
Similar distinctions can be drawn in two additional ways. First, a distinc-
tion may be made between facts contained in a peer review committee report
and the opinions and conclusions drawn from those facts. This distinction was
made in Gillman v. United States, 21 one of the few cases to create a privilege
judicially. In Gillman, the plaintiff sought a report that contained a review of
circumstances surrounding a patient's suicide. The report consisted of factual
testimony as to how the incident occurred and opinion testimony relating to
improvement of hospital procedure. 23 Relying on Bredice, the Gillman court
held that factual statements relating to the occurrence and made by hospital
personnel were discoverable. However, doctoral conclusions and recommenda-
tions relating to future procedures were deemed privileged."' The court fur-
ther distinguished mere conclusions and factual statements taken shortly after
an occurrence. The latter are unique and can never be duplicated, whereas the
former are the product of deliberation."25 Likewise, in Tucson Medical Center
v. Misevch, 126 the court drew a line between factual investigative matters,
115. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-26.2 (1977).
116. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1960 (Supp. 1984); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 16-
4-2-4 (Burns 1983).
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1908 (1982).
118. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 § 405.24(k) (1979).
119. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (Supp. 1984).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
123. Id. at 318.
124. Id. at 319.
125. Id.
126. 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976).
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which are discoverable, and materials that are the product of reflective consid-
eration or a policy-making process, which are not discoverable. 12 7
The difference between "ad hoe" reports and periodic review by standing
committees provides the third fact-opinion distinction. An ad hoc, or incident,
report is developed to shed light on the cause of an untoward happening in the
hospital and to help prevent its recurrence.128 To the extent that it generally
focuses on a single occurrence as opposed to a review of numerous case histo-
ries, the ad hoc report differs from regular, periodic peer review. At least as to
the patient-plaintiff, who is the subject of the ad hoc report, there is a greater
argument for allowing discovery. This type report would contain information
clearly relevant to the manner in which the plaintiff was injured.1 29 Like the
reports sought in Gillman, these reports contain purely factual material not
obtainable from other sources.130
The Chandra court failed to delineate expressly between factual and de-
liberative matter contained within peer review committee reports. Nor did it
consider the difference between ad hoc and regular peer review committee re-
ports. However, the court's holding did suggest that the difference should be
observed, The court held that no peer review privilege exists for factual state-
ments.1 31 To the extent that trial judges read the Chandra opinion to hold that
factual statements are discoverable and opinion matters are privileged, a dis-
tinction between the two types of reports may be made in practice.113 2
127. Id. at 37, 545 P.2d at 961.
128. Hall, supra note 18, at 267-68.
129. R. MORRISEY, RISK MANAGEMENT FOR HOsPITALS & HEALTH CARE INSTI-
TUTIONS 58-64 (1979).
130. Gillman, 53 F.R.D. at 319 (factual portions of incident report
discoverable).
131. Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 808.
132. The Chandra court did note that their holding would not prohibit a trial
court from granting an appropriate protective order. Id. at 807-08. Mo. R. Civ. P.
56.01(c) provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice re-
quires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions,
including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than
that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discov-
ery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated
by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or com-
mercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information en-
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The Missouri legislature should consider these distinctions in drafting a
statute.13 3 By making the distinction between those matters originating in peer
review and those which are otherwise discoverable, '3 a greater balance be-
tween the interests of the plaintiff and the interest of enhancing peer review is
achieved. The same may be said for the distinction between the facts con-
tained in the peer review reports and the opinions and conclusions drawn from
them. By allowing plaintiffs to discover factual matter, even though it is
presented at peer review committee meetings, there is less chance that the peer
review system will be abused. Furthermore, a privilege, because it withholds
certain truths and therefore hinders the proper adjudication of an action,
should be circumspect. 35 The statutory privilege should not prevent the dis-
covery of any more data than is necessary to protect the peer review function.
A statute properly limited would not prevent a plaintiff from making his case
on the basis of factual material available. Thus, surveys, eyewitness reports,
the patient's records, and other factual material should not be privileged.3 6
Conversely, peer review committee reports which are not factual should
not be available to make the plaintiff's case. The portions of the report which
contain only opinion, conclusion, or other information of a deliberative nature
should not be discoverable. A plaintiff should not be allowed to treat peer
review participants as unwilling experts in lieu of hiring his own witnesses.1 37
Trial judges would be called upon to determine which matters are opinion and
which are factual. An alternative or additional limitation is to provide a privi-
lege for discovery but allow an exception, similar to the work product rule, 38
for good cause in extraordinary cases. Hence, a plaintiff who could not other-
wise state a case, or survive a directed verdict, might obtain the peer review
closed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If a motion for protective order is denied in whole or part, the court may,
on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person pro-
vide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 61.01 apply to the award of
expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
See also, Welsh v. Dean Witter Reynolds Org. Inc., 657 S.W.2d 27, 30 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1983) (trial court has discretion to issue appropriate orders to protect confidenti-
ality); State ex rel. Cain v. Baker, 540 S.W.2d 50, 57 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (protective
order timely filed to withhold privileged communications); State ex reL Litton Business
Sys. v. Bondurant, 523 S.W.2d 587, 592 (Mo. App., W.D. 1975) (denial of protective
order relating to business records within the discretion of the trial court).
133. This recommendation is in line with the apparent intent of the Chandra
court in that it makes the fact-opinion distinction that the court implied. The court
held that under Missouri law no factual privilege exists for factual statements. See
Chandra, 678 S.W.2d at 813.
134. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (Supp. 1984).
135. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
138. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 553 (4th ed. 1983).
The work product rule provides a limited privilege for material prepared by the attor-
ney. It is limited in that, by making a showing of necessity and good cause, an adver-
sary may discover the material.
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reports.
In conclusion, it is clear that the consternation caused by the Chandra
decision would be best alleviated by a statutory discovery privilege. Tension
between the medical and legal professions is already at an uncomfortable
level.139 Increased apprehension of malpractice in an already shell-shocked
profession will not lessen the tension. Allowing each question of discoverability
of peer review committee reports to be made at the trial court level furthers
that apprehension in that hospitals have no real guidelines in preparing the
reports. A carefully drawn statutory privilege would provide a measure of pre-
dictability to hospital administrators and members of peer review commit-
tees. 140 Guidelines would allow the hospital to concentrate on improving health
care through the medium of peer review without worrying about how to play
"hide the ball" with committee reports.1 4' Members of peer review committees
would operate with the knowledge that their opinions will not be used
improperly.
Properly limited, a discovery privilege would not prevent a plaintiff from
winning a lawsuit against a hospital or doctor.1 42 A plaintiff would still have
access to his own charts and records and to the testimony of any person who
provided or had other firsthand knowledge of the treatment. A plaintiff would
also have the opportunity to hire an expert to examine and evaluate the qual-
ity of care the plaintiff received. In the event that no information other than
peer review records are available, a statutory scheme might provide for discov-
ery after a showing of necessity.
To reiterate, the policy behind providing a statutory privilege for peer
review is compelling. Peer review is a vital function in improving health care.
The peer review conference is conducted in the spirit of education and im-
provement. Critical conclusions and opinions stated at the committee meeting
must be made with objectivity and candor to be effective. Allowing discovery
of the entire peer review proceedings inhibits that objectivity and replaces it
139. See generally Note, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Kansas Response
to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 566, 566-67 (1984); Devito,
Abuse of Litigation: Plague of the Medical Profession, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1984, at 23-
25 (inherent acrimony causes physicians great problems). But see Manger, Medical
Malpractice: The Answers to Mr. Devito, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1984, at 10-13 (reply to
Mr. Devito's accusations).
140. Case-by-case determination has a deleterious effect because each ruling
leaves the parties uncertain as to what protection is afforded. This criticism has also
been leveled at the exception to statutory privilege which allows discovery in extraordi-
nary circumstances. See Note, supra note 38, at 1098-99.
141. Chandra will change the way that hospitals conduct their internal investiga-
tions. See The Springfield (Mo.) News-Leader, Feb. 10, 1985, at 3B, col. 5 (statements
of Dave Tapp and Jerry Sill).
142. One such instance might occur where a plaintiff is suing a hospital on a
negligent hiring cause of action. Absent the peer review report on a doctor's compe-
tency it may be difficult to prove knowledge on the part of the hospital. See generally
Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 18.
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with apprehension of malpractice litigation. The Chandra court indicated that
opinion material should not be discoverable. Therefore, enactment of a statu-
tory privilege would serve to codify and refine the court's suggested approach.
Consequently, legislative action appears to be the preferable solution to resolv-
ing the scope of peer review discoverability recognized in Chandra.
PETER F. DANIEL
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